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Abstract 
This research examines the potential means available to company managers, auditors and regulators of preventing, detecting and 
reacting to financial statement fraud. Research is conducted by means of interviews with company managers, auditors and 
regulators. The findings are, while management integrity and the development of internal systems to prevent fraudulent reporting 
can help to reduce the probability of financial statement fraud taking place, the nature of financial statement fraud as a crime in 
which the company is an instrument and not a victim makes it essential that penalties enforced by regulators are used to deter and 
react to cases where such frauds are detected. 
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1. Introduction   
 
Financial statement fraud control has attracted considerable attention and associated response in recent years due to 
the incalculable collateral damage that could drain the long term success of companies. Financial statement should be 
seemed as the reliable tool for investors to make investment decision and company’s stakeholders to appraise the 
company’s financial performance. Nevertheless, due to a number of the reported financial statement fraud cases, the 
public confidence in accounting and auditing profession has been eroded and also gives a huge impact to the fraud 
companies. The UK Fraud Act 2006, based on one element of financial statement fraud, states that “a person is guilty of 
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fraud if he breaches any sections listed in subsection (2), which includes (2a) false by representation, (2b) fraud by 
failing to disclose information and (2c) fraud by abuse of position”. In respect to financial statement fraud allegations, 
section 2 of the UK Fraud Act 2006 is presumably relevant. Fraud in financial statements comprises (1) false numbers 
or representation, (2) inaccurate information that may relate to fraud by failing to disclose the correct information and 
also (3) involvement of company’s directors or top management. Therefore, it could be charged as fraud due to an abuse 
of position. The above sections are entirely relevant to financial statement fraud allegations as they involve the 
falsification of accounts and records, which, ultimately, misleads the financial statement users. In this case, the false 
financial reporting can be associated with market manipulation through which the manipulation of financial figures is 
achieved to mislead the company’s investors. As a contribution to the body of knowledge this research aims to present 
recommendations to improve financial statement fraud control in commercial companies. The research also evaluates 
the current strategies for the prevention and detection of financial statement fraud and the reaction thereto. Based on the 
experience of two Malaysian commercial companies, the research provides the strategies and mechanism to control in 
particular, financial statement fraud control.  
Financial statement fraud differs from other frauds in the corporate environment in that instead of being the victim or 
perpetrator of fraud, the company is often the instrument of fraud. This may reduce incentives for companies to control 
frauds which are perpetrated against third parties, often investors and not against the company itself. In addition, while 
inside involvement is common and therefore the perpetrators are working within the company’s systems, the 
perpetrators are likely to be in senior management roles and therefore have the power to design or circumvent controls. 
A further and consequential difference between financial statement fraud and fraud against the corporation is that 
financial statement fraud need not have any effect on the corporation’s actual business. It is a matter of misreporting 
business results to outsiders, which can be achieved by intervention at any stage in the record-keeping process, often 
without affecting the records used for internal reporting and decision making and often by those who are in possession 
of the full facts and in a position to base business decisions on their knowledge, without being misled by their own false 
reports. This therefore attenuates the business case for financial statement fraud prevention. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The victims of financial statement fraud are typically investors in companies (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998), 
particularly investors at initial public offerings (IPOs) where wealth flows directly from investors to the company and 
become available for use at the discretion of management. 
Strategies and controls in relation to financial statement fraud control are a necessity in today’s business 
environment. According to Biegelman (2009), “[a]n ounce of prevention does equal a pound of cure”; therefore, the risk 
of fraud can be reduced through a combination of prevention, deterrence, and detection measures. According to a recent 
study by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2012), companies without fraud control have experienced fraud 
losses of approximately 45% median larger than the companies with fraud controls. In relation to this, it is important for 
every company to place fraud control, particularly the strategy of prevention, detection and response towards financial 
statement fraud. The strategy could persuade individuals that they should not commit fraud because of the increased 
likelihood of prevention, detection and the new punishment.  There are two parties involved in controlling financial 
statement fraud, namely, the regulators of the country and the company itself.  These two parties have to play their 
respective roles in order to mitigate fraud.  In addition, the audit committee can be a part of the monitoring mechanism 
to oversee the integrity and quality of the financial statement process. Johnson (2002, cited in Solaiman, 2006) 
documents that, ‘good legal rules’ are one of the important parameters in the development of the securities market. 
Johnson indicates that securities regulation and accounting best practices are two important mechanisms for combating 
financial statement fraud. 
Financial statement fraud control possibly reduces the impact of financial statement fraud; therefore, it provides 
efficiency savings to investors. In addition, public awareness towards financial statement fraud control is considered 
important to reduce financial statement fraud cases. However, the study of insurance fraud in Nigeria indicates that the 
little concern of fraud issues by public has created a worse problem in managing fraud control in Nigeria (Yusuf and 
Babalola, 2009). Albrecht (2003, 2005) notes that ‘financial statement fraud causes a decrease in market value of stock 
of approximately 500 to 1,000 times the amount of money’. In one case, a $7 million fraud caused a drop in stock value 
of about $2 billion. In relation to this, the research found the need for every commercial company to find ways to 
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mitigate financial statement fraud. In relation to financial statement fraud control measurement, the research found that 
improvements in governance are possibly effective in reducing financial statement fraud cases in Malaysia. 
Transparency of financial reporting and accountability of company management towards financial statement fraud 
control are two important principles that help to reduce financial statement fraud in all organizations. As previous 
financial scandals have established, a lack of transparency and accountability create the incentive for top management 
to commit fraud (Gilsinan et al., 2008). Considering the contextual fundamentals of corporate culture, top managers are 
seen as a major cause of corporate crime, thus ethical top management possibly reduces corporate crime, particularly in 
relation to financial statement fraud (Clinard, 1983). In this case, control among the top management is found to be 
important in reducing the case of financial statement fraud in commercial companies.  
Albrecht (2002) also proposes that fraud policy should be one in which the tone is set at the top and that it must be 
clear that the rules will be applied to all employees, including management.  In addition, Farrell and Franco (1999) 
highlight the responsibilities of management for creating the anti-fraud programmes and controls. According to the 
auditing standard, SAS 99, auditors and management have the ultimate responsibility for establishing the controls and 
procedures to protect the organization’s assets. The most important elements consist of (1) creating and maintaining a 
culture of honesty and high ethics among the employees, (2) evaluating the risks of fraud, and implementing risk 
mitigation in relation to the financial statement, (3) and developing an appropriate oversight process by internal and 
external parties towards financial statement fraud. According to the AICPA (2009), the most effective way to 
implement measures to reduce wrongdoing is to base them on a set of core values. This will provide a platform upon 
which a more detailed code of conduct can be constructed, giving more specific guidance about permitted and 
prohibited behaviour, based on the applicable laws and the organization’s values. Hence, management needs to clearly 
express that all employees will be held accountable for acting within the organization’s code of conduct. The document 
should identify the measures an organization should take to prevent, deter and detect fraud. However, Dion (2008) 
suggests that the corporate codes of ethics are not sufficient to strengthen the ethical behaviour due to the lack of self-
evidence to identify the right things and perceive rationalization. In order to strengthen the ethical behaviour among the 
company individuals, the company is supposed to close or minimise the opportunity and rationalization of people to 
commit financial statement fraud.  
The audit committee should be viewed as a value-added oversight function as required by the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission. The enactment of SOX 2002 is expected to improve the independence, 
objectivity, and effectiveness of the audit committee. The empirical studies have suggested the need for independent 
members of the board of directors (audit committee) to have sufficient financial expertise in scrutinising the financial 
information (Goldschmidt, 2004; Jayasuriya, 2006). In another response to financial statement fraud in the United 
States, the FBI sought expanded cooperation with the Certified Public Accountants (CPA) in fighting corporate fraud.  
The FBI believed that the roles, the independence and the integrity of CPAs are uniquely suited to the partnership. 
Thus, the CPAs will be the third party expert witnesses and eyewitnesses for the FBI. The mode of cooperation will be 
dealt with in the way of (1) handling the scope of the problem, (2) identifying common accounting schemes, and (3) 
working effectively under the impact of the SOX 2002 and related rules and regulations. In relation to the company’s 
action, research by Chen, Kelly and Salterio (2006) suggest that a large number of outside directors would contribute to 
control financial statement fraud in the company. A large proportion of outside directors would be helpful in monitoring 
the firm’s activities and deterring company fraud. Specifically, Beasley (1996) refers to the outside directors as all non-
employee directors. He suggests that the longer the tenure of directors in the company, the better the control and 
mitigation of financial statement fraud would be. Beasley (1996) supports this argument noting that he had located a 
company with a large proportion of outside directors with longer tenure and that the company experienced a lower level 
of financial statement fraud.  Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) add that directors or chairmen with shorter tenure 
have less company experience and therefore, they are unable to deter fraud in the company. Furthermore, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) recommend that outside directors should increase their monitoring tasks. Therefore, they would not plot 
with top managers to confiscate the shareholders’ wealth. Fama and Jensen (1983) also discuss what is expected from 
the external directors. They are supposed to be (1) decision experts, (2) understand the importance of decision control, 
and (3) able to work with the decision control system in a company.  
The board of directors is possibly the most effective internal control mechanism to monitor the actions of top 
management.  Beasley (1996) found that board composition plays a greater role in controlling financial statement fraud.  
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He also reported that the accounting regulators and standard setters recognize the importance of directors as one of the 
internal control mechanisms for the prevention of financial statement fraud.  For example, two reports from the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) contain recommendations for board independency to 
mitigate financial statement fraud in a company. Deachow et al. (1996) suggests that the establishment of an internal 
governance process in every company will be a part of the internal control process in relation to financial statement 
fraud. The purpose of this is to maintain the reliability of financial statements by controlling manipulation activities. 
Alternatively, Rezaee (2002) suggests that the executives’ compensation packages (stock options and bonuses) should 
be eliminated, thus financial statement fraud could be prevented in the companies. In this case, the companies’ 
shareholders should be given proper authority to approve the executive compensation packages to avoid fraud within a 
company. Rezaee (2002) also suggests a practical monitoring mechanism to control financial statement fraud. This 
includes direct oversight functions by the board of directors, the audit committee, external auditors, and regulatory 
agencies.  Therefore, the effective role and responsibility of the board of directors in the company should be set to the 
“tone at the top” and they should not tolerate any misstatements in financial statements. In addition, indirect overseeing 
functions by a company’s owner/investor, analysts, institutional investors, and investment bankers should also be a part 
of the monitoring mechanism. 
The effective internal control structure and audit functions are found to be important mechanisms for controlling 
financial statement fraud. NCIR (1987) documents that the management is responsible for designing adequate and 
effective internal controls in the financial statement process. The internal auditors and external auditors have to ensure 
that the internal controls designed are adequate and effective in preventing and detecting financial statement fraud. In 
relation to this, internal auditors are responsible for assisting management to design, maintain, and monitor the internal 
controls system. In the meantime, external auditors have been considered as having the responsibility to detect any 
material misstatements in the financial statements. Auditors are also expected to be independent in their social role, 
which will contribute to the accountability of corporate management, and therefore, increase the value of the reported 
financial information issued by the company management. However, audit practitioners are considered to have failed in 
their ethical duty if they do not make use of safeguarding mechanisms, such as whistle-blowing, and perform their role 
as expected by the audit profession (Alleyne, Hudaib and Pike, 2013). 
In relation to the effect of internal controls on quality of information in financial statements, Altamuro and Beatty 
(2010) found that improved internal controls did lead to an improvement in financial reporting. However, this was in a 
context of a risk of biased optimistic or pessimistic reporting rather than thoroughgoing fraud. 
The role of external audit in financial statement fraud prevention is crucial. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) found that 
reporting immediately prior to IPOs was more conservative than at other times and attributed this to heightened audit 
attention, while Chen, Kelly and Salterio (2012) found that managers who were in a position to falsify figures in 
accounts were less likely to do so if they learnt of external audit actions designed to prevent this. However, external 
auditors cannot always be relied on to detect financial statement fraud, as they have only limited resources to do so. 
Moreover, external auditors tend to see it as being beyond the scope of their work to detect fraud in general (Humphrey, 
Moizer and Turley, 1993) and may, by extension, be tempted to view fraud detection as not being part of their job at all. 
Moreover, in countries such as the UK, it is very difficult for investors to sue an auditor, because the investor has no 
immediate relationship with the auditor, except where additional circumstances have caused such a relationship to arise 
(as in ADT Ltd v BDO Binder Hamlyn [1996]) and because neither the audit opinion nor the financial statements 
contain any investment advice (Candler v Crane, Christmas and Co. [1951], Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990]). 
 
3. Research Objectives 
 
This research examines the question of what measures can be put in place to control financial statement fraud and its 
effects. It examines three questions: 
 
1. What measures are presently taken to prevent financial statement fraud? 
2. What measures are presently taken to detect financial statement fraud if it occurs? 
3. What responses are made to financial statement fraud if it is detected? 
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4. Methods 
 
The research was conducted by means of semi-structured interviews with interviewees drawn from the management 
of two industrial companies in Malaysia, one interviewee each from four Malaysian regulatory bodies, two interviewees 
(one auditor and one forensic accountant) from each of two large audit firms and one representative from an 
independent company management. The interviews were conducted in Malaysia between 2009 and 2012. 
 
5. Results and recommendations for anti-fraud programme: the strategies of prevention, detection and response 
in relation to financial statement fraud 
 
The research offers insights into the importance of having an anti-fraud programme, in particularly the prevention, 
detection and response strategies of financial statement fraud in response to a review of the guidelines for Managing the 
Business Risk of Fraud. The research suggests that the design of the anti-fraud programme should focus on three main 
elements: 1) financial statement fraud risk mechanism, (2) financial statement fraud risk evaluation, and (3) financial 
statement fraud risk responsiveness. The focus on these three elements is significant to ensure that sufficient control for 
financial statement fraud is incorporated in the designed anti-fraud programme.  
 
5.1 Financial statement fraud risk mechanism 
 
The financial statement fraud risk mechanism aims to provide details of the programme designed to ensure the 
adaptability and compliance of the programme.  In relation to this, the research includes three strategies of prevention, 
detection and response in relation to financial statement fraud that are supposed to be matched with the nature of the 
business, organizational structure and the whole system of the organization. To achieve this, the research integrates all 
the research findings in recommending the anti-fraud programme, in particularly the prevention, detection and response 
strategies in relation to financial statement fraud. To be an effective anti-fraud programme, the three strategies designed 
should be well distributed across the company to ensure every individual in the organization comprehends the process 
of the strategies and their own roles and responsibilities. Once a clear explanation is provided in the programme, the 
company has to focus more on financial statement fraud evaluation and responsiveness. The research further elaborates 
the recommended three strategies of prevention, detection and response in relation to financial statement fraud as 
financial statement fraud control in commercial companies. 
 
5.1.1 Prevention strategies 
 
Prevention strategies should be supported from both the internal and external environments. The prevention from the 
internal environment is gained from the prevention strategies designed by the company management and the prevention 
from the external environment is achieved from the regulators and the relevant independent bodies. The following seven 
prevention strategies are found to be effective in financial statement fraud prevention in an organization:- 
 
i. Values of honesty and integrity 
 
The first prevention strategy concerns the values of honesty and integrity, particularly among the top management. 
Even though these values cannot be legislated or measured by the company, these could be cultured in the organization 
beginning with the process of recruitment and on-going training across the company. The values of integrity and 
honesty are important to build a strong tone at the top. The strong tone at the top could be achieved through the 
independent selection of company directors. Therefore, the nomination committee plays an important role in ensuring 
that the company directors are appointed accordingly. Once the tone at the top has been established in the organisation, 
the company will perhaps be able to culture the values throughout the organisation.  
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ii. Specific internal control over financial statement 
 
The second financial statement fraud prevention strategy identified is specifically through internal control over the 
financial statement. The control designed should be considered in each accounting process and identification of any 
potential financial statement fraud risk should be made. In this case, the company needs to identify the indicator or red 
flag that might exist in each accounting process. The control should be designed by the chief financial officer and 
approved by the audit committee. 
 
iii. Assessment of internal control over financial statement 
 
The third prevention strategy relates to the second strategy. It is suggested that the company hire an external auditor 
to assess the effectiveness of the internal control design for the financial statement process. Although the process might 
incur additional cost, the company has to measure this against the huge impact of financial statement fraud.  
 
iv. Participation of internal auditor in financial statement auditing 
 
The fourth strategy is the involvement of the internal auditor in financial statement auditing, as discussed in the 
above paragraphs. Internal auditing of the financial statement in public companies would not incur additional cost. 
However, the company has to ensure the competency of the internal auditors in accounting and auditing of financial 
statements. 
 
v. Greater role of board audit committee 
 
The sixth prevention strategy of financial statement fraud has been found in the role of the audit committee. The role 
of the audit committee is important in financial statement fraud control. The committee acts as the independent body of 
the company to oversee the integrity of the financial statements and the internal control designed. The proactive role of 
the audit committee in overseeing the financial matters is highly significant in financial statement fraud control. The 
experience and the competency of the audit committee contribute to effective overseeing of the reported financial 
statement. Therefore, they have to pick up and deal with any issue raised by the external auditors. 
 
vi. Financial statement fraud risk management 
 
The seventh prevention strategy pertains to financial statement fraud risk management. Every company needs to 
design a specific risk management programme to control financial statement fraud. As the internal control over the 
financial statement has been designed in relation to the financial statement process, the financial statement fraud risk 
management programme is supposed to cover the four elements of governance, people, methods and practice. The 
internal control over the financial statement and the financial statement fraud risk management programme supposedly 
covers the accounting system and the non-accounting system. 
 
vii. Effective corporate governance 
 
The eighth prevention strategy of financial statement fraud complements all the other prevention strategies with 
effective corporate governance among the board of directors. The practice of corporate governance, specifically in 
Malaysia, is not compulsory for public companies unless the public company has been listed on the stock exchange. 
Listed public companies are required by Bursa Malaysia to report their corporate governance practice which gives 
assurance to the company’s stakeholders. The effective practice of corporate governance would be achieved through the 
combination of good structure of company’s board of directors and a strong tone at the top. The independent conduct of 
company directors that create the strong tone at the top would prevent financial statement fraud from the top 
management. 
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5.1.2 Detection strategies 
 
The research findings indicate that conventional detection methods are commonly found from whistle blowing and 
hotlines. In addition to these detection procedures, the internal auditing and external auditing are expected to detect 
fraud in financial statements. In relation to this, the research suggests that the companies consider the detection tools 
and software, as initiated by previous research through data mining techniques (Bose and Mahapatra, 2001), Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis (Altman, 1968), Financial Statement Fraud Ontology (Dillon and Hadzic, 2009) and Benford’s 
Law (Durtschi, Hillison and Pacini, 2004). The research also enables the companies to clearly describe what constitutes 
financial statement fraud to assist the individual in reporting the misconduct. In addition, the informers should be highly 
protected. The research also suggests the availability of whistle blowing and hotline channels to directly report to the 
Securities Commission. Therefore, any perpetration by high level company management would be controlled and 
mitigated.  
 
5.1.3 Response strategies 
 
The research suggests four actions that should be taken by the companies in their response strategies. Firstly, the 
board of directors have to give priority to the issue of financial statement fraud in board meetings. To implement the 
antifraud programme, the board needs to establish the fraud committee that consists of independent directors and 
dependent directors.  The role of independent directors is found to be important in the case of the involvement of 
company directors in financial statement fraud. Secondly, the fraud committee should plan the response procedures in 
any case of financial statement fraud. The fraud committee is accountable for providing the fraud reporting channel 
until the prosecution process, through which the perpetrators of financial statement fraud will be dealt in accordance to 
the company’s fraud policy and the necessary disciplinary action before legal action is taken. Thirdly, the research 
suggests that the board of directors establish a fraud investigation committee. The committee would be responsible in 
investigating the reported cases, examining the causes of fraud, identifying the breach of financial statement process 
control, and suggesting the improvement of the identified control. Fourthly, the research promotes the appointment of 
forensic accountants to deal with the financial statement fraud investigation. Forensic accountants are expert in auditing, 
accounting and investigative skills pertaining to accounting fraud, particularly, and financial statement fraud. The 
research found that the anti-fraud programme is significant in controlling financial statement fraud cases in public 
companies. The strategies designed reflect the non-tolerance of any financial statement fraud case in the company and 
show that the companies have responded to financial statement fraud appropriately and in a timely manner.   
 
5.2 Financial statement fraud evaluation 
 
The research considers financial statement fraud risk evaluation as an important system to evaluate the potential risk 
of financial statement fraud. The company management has to identify the exposure of financial statement fraud risk for 
each financial statement process. The identified exposure should be evaluated periodically through which the financial 
statement fraud schemes would be identified. The schemes for prevention of financial statement fraud might exist in a 
variety of departments, places and groups of population in the company.  In relation to this, each company has to focus 
on the identification of financial statement fraud perpetrators and how they exploit the system and hide the fraud. 
 
5.3 Financial statement fraud responsiveness  
 
In addition to the financial statement fraud risk mechanism and evaluation, the research considers that the 
responsiveness of financial statement fraud risk is significant to ensure that the entire management is adhering to the 
programme designed. Therefore, the commitment from the company individuals should be done through the affirmation 
process. The affirmation process should be signed by the employees to affirm their understanding concerning the 
controls designed. In another effort to show the responsiveness, the conflict of interest disclosure should be signed by 
the company management. The responsiveness of this anti-fraud programme can be achieved through the monitoring 
process by the company management together with the internal and external auditors. The monitoring process should 
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also focus on the reporting procedures and risk management programme.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The research contributes to the study of financial statement fraud. The research also contributes new knowledge to 
the practical control of financial statement fraud, which requires an effective financial statement fraud risk mechanism 
and strategies. The research offers anti-fraud programmes, particularly in respect of the prevention, detection and 
response strategies as part of a company’s efforts to mitigate financial statement fraud. External controls are gained 
from the participation of regulators to increase the imposed penalties and charges of financial statement fraud. The 
findings of this research are consistent with those of Ibargüen and Ayala (2006) who suggested that new government 
regulations and severe penalties for the fraud perpetrators are one approach to generate reliable financial information 
and to rebuild trust in the capital market institutions.  
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